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MAXWELL M. BLECHER AND DAPHNE M. STEGMAN*
The Ninth Circuit has recently handed down a decision in Hanson
v. Shell Oil Co.' which, at first blush, purports to lay down a rather
rigid economic rule for the resolution of price-cutting issues under the
"attempt to monopolize" portion of section 2 of the Sherman Act.2
This article will examine the rationale of Hanson and its potential util-
ity as a guideline for analyzing price-cutting that is claimed to consti-
tute an attempt to monopolize. Similar and alternative approaches
suggested by recent opinions from the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere also
will be discussed with a view toward identifying current trends in this
uncertain area of antitrust law.
I. THE PROBLEM
In analyzing the specific intent to monopolize element of attempts
to monopolize, the courts have traditionally used three basic ap-
proaches, the "legitimate business purpose approach," the "unfairness
approach," and the "gestalt approach. 3  Professors Areeda and
Turner, in a recent law review article4 argued that because existing case
law had provided only "vague formulations"5 of the predatory pricing
offense,6 a cost/price analysis should be undertaken to test the illegal-
ity of pricing practices. They reject the over-simplified "pricing-below-
(average) cost" test on the ground that a firm may be legitimately
* Members, California Bar. Mr. Blecher is a member of and Ms. Stegman is associated
with the firm of Blecher, Collins & Hoecker, Los Angeles, California.
1. 541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 813 (1977).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). This section states:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding fifty thou-
sand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments,
in the discretion of the court.
Sherman Act section 2 is hereinafter sometimes referred to as "section 2."
3. The categories are derived from Hawk, Attempts to Monopoli:e-Specfic Intent as
Antitrust's Ghost in the Machine, 58 CORNELL L. Rav. 1121 (1973). Hawk cited the following
cases and language to illustrate these categories: Times/Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594, 622 (1953) ("predominantly motivated by legitimate business purposes);
Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 125, 140 (D. Mass. 1959),
modified, 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961) ("there must be evidence
that the person who foresees a fight to the death intends to use or actually does use unfair
weapons."); Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 369 F.2d 449, 459 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd on
other grounds, 389 U.S. 384 (1967) (jury instructed to examine the "whole picture").
4. Areeda and Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 HAZv. L. Rav. 697 (1975).
5. Id. at 698.
6. "Predatory pricing" is price manipulation that exceeds legitimate competitive pricing.
See text accompanying note 75 infra.
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loss-minimizing at a price well below average cost.7  The authors find
the key factor to be marginal cost8 and conclude, insofar as it is per-
tinent here, that: a short-run profit-maximizing (or loss-minimizing)
price is lawful even though below average cost;9 a price at or above
average cost is lawful even though it is not short-run profit-maximi-
zing;10 pricing at or above short-run marginal-and average variable-
cost is lawful even though not loss-minimizing in the short run;"l and
unless priced at or above average cost, a price below short-run mar-
ginal (or average variable) cost is unlawful.1 2 They would not penalize
limit pricing-deliberately pricing below a short-run profit-maximization
point to deter entry or destroy competition-because the lower price and
higher productivity are socially beneficial and because only less efficient
competitors will be driven out. 3
In response, Dr. F.M. Scherer, an economist with the Federal
Trade Commission, sharply criticized the Areeda/Turner article.'
4
Scherer feels it is "unrealistic and even analytically wrong" 15 to utilize
a simple short-run cost analysis and would substitute variables empha-
sizing long-term policy considerations.' 6  He suggests the need for a
thorough examination of market structure and entry conditions, the be-
havior of the monopolist under scrutiny, and the monopolist's intent.'
7
In short, he espouses an overall factual analysis and bluntly concludes
that use of the Areeda/Turner test is "likely to reach economically un-
sound decisions."'
8
Areeda and Turner replied in a second law review article.' 9 While
conceding a point raised by Scherer concerning the wisdom of toler-
ating prices below marginal cost but above average cost,20 the authors
steadfastly maintain that long-run considerations are "intrinsically
7. A "firm that is selling at a shortrun profit-maximizing (or loss-minimizing) price clearly
is not a predator." Areeda and Turner, Predatory Pricing and Relaied Practices under Section 2
of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 697, 703 (1975).
8. Because marginal cost is difficult to determine, the author; provide alternative tests in
terms of average variable cost. Id. at 733.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 733-34.
11. Id. at 734.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 705.
14. Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARv. L. Ruv. 869
(1976).
15. Id. at 890.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Areeda and Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 HARv. L. Rtv, 891
(1976).
20. Id. at 891. With deference, they propose a modification whereby a price at or above
average cost would be presumptively lawful unless it were proven to be substantially below mar-
ginal cost. Id. at 894.
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speculative and indeterminate," 2' as illustrated by Scherer's collection
of proposed variables. Scherer's response22 maintains that the Areeda/
Turner rule is "inconsistent with long-term economic efficiency'o-his
primary concern as a government economist. Although the debate
may continue in law review articles, in the courts the excitement over
the prospect of finding a panacea in the Areeda/Turner approach is
already dying down. The marginal/average variable cost test has been
recognized as useful, though far from indispensible.
Under the troublesome "attempt to monopolize" portion of section
2 of the Sherman Act,24 the federal courts have had particular difficulty
in resolving claims of so-called "predatory pricing," and the law review
analysts25 have fared no better in reaching a consensus on when price
cutting is actionable as "predatory." Since attempts, as opposed to
actual monopolization, pose such difficulties in antitrust enforcement by
the government, the attempt section received little judicial scrutiny
until the explosive rise of private treble damage actions in the attempt
area two decades ago.
When a price cut is legitimately competitive and thus not pro-
scribed by section 2 is seldom readily apparent, and the courts have
been understandably reluctant to risk applying the potent sanctions of
the Act to the vigorous competitor whose pricing policies are motivated
by instincts of self-preservation rather than exclusionary and monopo-
listic aspirations. The key to the judicial resolution of this dilemma has
been the analysis of the intent accompanying a defendant's price-cut.
But it is rare that a businessman appends a declaration of purpose to his
latest price listings, and his intracorporate memoranda are seldom sus-
ceptible to unequivocal interpretation concerning his motives.2 6  The
evaluation of "predatory intent" thus normally is derived from circum-
stantial evidence, which carries a strong potential for injustice or
abject error. 7
21. Id. at 897.
22. Scherer, Some Last Words on Predatory Pricing, 89 HARV. L. RPv. 901 (1976).
23. Id. at 903.
24. See note 2 supra.
25. See note 3 supra, and Blecher, Attempt to Monopolize Under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act: "Dangerous Probability" of Monopolization Within the "Relevant Market". 38 GEo. WAs.
L. Rnv. 215 (1969).
26. In Ben Hur Coal Co. v. Wells, 242 F.2d 481,484 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 910
(1957), the plaintiff apparently presented direct evidence of defendant's subjective intent to injure
plaintiff. Although the court of appeals noted the existence of that testimony, it affirmed the
decision in favor of the defendant.
27. The following cases illustrate how certain factors have been utilized by courts as evi-
dence supporting a finding of specific intent: Klor's v. Broadway Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959)
(conduct); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1952) (market power); Coleman
Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1975) (conduct as permitting inference of
intent and probability of success); Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir.)
(direct evidence of coercion), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957); W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v.
Carlisle Corp., 381 F. Supp. 680 (D. Del. 1974) (conduct in which market share merely "sub-
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II. HANSON V. SHELL OIL CO.
Hanson v. Shell Oil Co.2 8 involved claims by an independent owner
of a service station that Shell and others had violated section 7 of the
Clayton Act29 and sections 130 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The trial
court had directed verdicts for Shell on claims of vertical restraint of
trade31 under Sherman Act section I and attempt to monopolize under
Sherman Act section 2. Following a jury verdict for Hanson on the
claims of a horizontal restraint of trade32 under Sherman Act section 2,
the trial court granted a new trial that resultel in a jury verdict for
Shell. Hanson appealed the directed verdicts and the grant of a new
trial.33
Between 1952 and 1964 Hanson had acquired, primarily on credit,
seventeen service stations in the Tucson area so that "by 1964, Hanson
[had] turned just under $7,000 into seventeen old service stations, one
natural gas distributorship, and hundreds of thousands of dollars of
debt. 34  He consistently lost money, and there was evidence that due
to inefficiency and exhaustion of credit, his sales volume was inadequate
to support indefinite operation. In 1962 he initiated an attempt to sell
his business, which was finally closed out in 1966. In the words of the
court: "Like many another loser in the competitive endeavor, he de-
cided to try the antitrust laws as a means of shifting his losses to some-
one else."
5
Hanson claimed that he had been a victim of retail gasoline price
wars caused by Shell's (and others') policy of driving private brands
and independents out of the market. More specifically, he claimed
that Shell had devised a predatory pricing scheme in which its dealers
were coerced into cooperation and that Standard and Shell had joined
together to ensure that the plan would affect only the independents, and
not each other.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's findings on four
grounds. First, Shell's maintaining one or two company-owned sta-
tions in Tucson, even if it put pressure on independents to conform to
Shell's suggested retail price was not violative of section 1 of the Sher-
stantiar'); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953) (mar-
ket power in which acts not predatory practices), afjfdper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
28. 541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 813 (1977).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
31. A vertical restraint of trade involves levels of distribution. An example is an agreement
between a retailer and a manufacturer to sell for at least a stated minimum price.
32. A horizontal restraint of trade involves persons at the ame level of the distribution
system. An example is an agreement between competing retailers to fix prices.
33. Also asserted on appeal were a statute of limitations error and the erroneous exclusion
of survey evidence. 541 F.2d at 1361-62.
34. 541 F.2d at 1355.
35. Id.
[Vol. 38:269
HANSON v. SHELL OIL CO.
man Aet.36  Second, Shell's "dealer assistance" program whereby Shell
lowered its wholesale price when it recommended a lower retail price
"was not initiated by Shell to force dealers to fix prices but was initia-
ted by dealers to enable them to stay competitive " 37 and was not con-
ditioned on a dealer's actually reducing his retail price3 -thus, it was
not unlawful. Third, there was insufficient evidence of coercion of retail
dealers to conform to Shell's pricing policies,39 under the Ninth Cir-
cuit's guidelines as promulgated in Gray v. Shell Oil Co. 40 Finally, the
court held that there was no causal connection between Shell's pricing
policies and Hanson's demise.41
Hanson based his attempt to monopolize claim on Shell's pricing
policy, but apparently his brief was significantly, if not totally, deficient
in factual and legal analysis of the section 2 attempt to monopolize
issues. One might speculate that the section 2 claim was nothing more
than an afterthought in a "blunderbuss" complaint and was never
paid serious attention either at trial or on appeal.
The court of appeals first addressed Hanson's threshold failure to
define a relevant market. If this opinion had not been written for the
Ninth Circuit, the balance of the discussion of predatory pricing and
specific intent might be entirely disregarded as dictum, since all other
circuits require proof of a relevant market in a section 2 attempt to
monopolize claim.42 The court then proceeded under the assumption
that Shell was being accused of attempting to monopolize the retail
market 43 by means of its pricing policy and entered upon a specific-
intent analysis. After pointing out that Hanson had not even taken the
trouble to brief the issue of specific intent, the court found that Hanson
had presented no evidence of specific intent and concluded that Shell's
price cutting was justifiable as merely an attempt to bolster its declin-
ing share of the Western Region market.44 This conclusion was based
on Hanson's failure to prove that Shell's pricing was below its marginal
or average variable cost. Such a failure, the court stated, resulted in,
as a matter of law, an absence of a prima facie case under section 2.'
36. Id. at 1356.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1356-57.
39. Id.
40. 469 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1972).
41. 541 F.2d at 1360. Judge Wright concurred in the result on the sole ground of lack of
causal connection. 541 F.2d at 1363.
42. E.J. Delaney Corp. v. Bonne Belle, Inc., 525 F.2d 296, 305 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 907 (1976) and cases cited therein.
43. The court concluded that any claim of attempted wholesale market monopolization
would fail for lack of causality. 541 F.2d at 1360.
44. Id. at 1358.
45. Id. at 1359.
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III. REQUIREMENTS FOR A FINDING OF ATTEMPT TO MONOPOLIZE
The requirements for a finding of attempt to monopolize under
section 2 of the Sherman Act were first enunciated by Justice Holmes
in Swift & Co. v. United States:
46
Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to produce a result which the
law seeks to prevent-for instance, the monopoly--but require further acts
in addition to the mere forces of nature to bring that result to pass, an in-
tent to bring it to pass is necessary in order to produce a dangerous prob-
ability that it will happen. . . .But when that intent and the consequent
dangerous probability exist, this statute, like many others and like the
common law in some cases, directs itself against that dangerous probabil-
ity as well as against the completed result.7
Unfortunately, Holmes introduced ambiguity at the outset, since this
passage may be interpreted as requiring intent and independent proof
of dangerous probability or as requiring only intent, which of itself
produces a consequent dangerous probability of success. The question
is thus raised whether or not the common-law doctrine of "factual
impossibility"'48 applies in attempt to monopolize cases or whether a
"mere" intent to monopolize, accompanied by an act directed toward
that purpose, is sufficient for a violation of section 2, despite the fact
that the actor may not have the ability or power to achieve monopoly
status.
The uncertainty of Swift is as yet unresolved and widely divergent
views have been expressed by the courts. At the one extreme are pro-
nouncements that appear to be based on dictionary definitions rather
than law: "An attempt is, as the term indicates, a conative effort to
achieve a result. The mere failure to succeed, or the impossibility of
success, does not negative an attempt."49  At the other extreme are
those decisions that paradoxically hold that to show that a defendant
has attempted to achieve the goal of monopolization it must first be
proven that he has in fact achieved that goal. For example, Car Dis-
tributing Co. v. Bay Distributors, Inc.5" contains the remarkable but not
isolated conclusion that attempt cases require proof of "a dangerous
probability that monopoly power . . . exists.""'
46. 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
47. Id. at 396 (citations omitted).
48. Factual impossibility refers to a situation where a defendant intends to accomplish an act
proscribed by the criminal law but is unable to accomplish the act because of circumstances, It is
generally not considered a defense to an attempted crime. LAF&VE & SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW,
440 (1972).
49. Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 376 F. Supp. 546, 561 (W.D. Pa. 1974), rov'd,
525 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1975).
50. 337 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D. Fla. 1971).
51. Id. at 1157. See Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 577, 590 n.28 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 868 (1974), (dangerous probability requires a showing that defendants had ability
to exclude competition); Kreager v. General Elec. Co., 497 F.2d 468, 471 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 861 (1974), (section 2 requires monopoly power, intent, and dangerous probability);
[Vol. 38:269
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A. Dangerous Probability and Relevant Market
The debate over the meaning of the "dangerous probability" re-
quirement has for the most part centered about the issue of whether
plaintiff must prove a relevant market as a prerequisite to a showing
that the defendant's exclusionary potential is dangerously close to
actual monopolization. In Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co.52 the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated broadly that "[w]hen the charge is
attempt . . . to monopolize, rather than monopolization, the relevant
market is 'not in issue.' " Though there is dictum to the contrary in
Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical
Corp.,54 the Ninth Circuit has recently affirmed the narrower meaning
of Lessig that relevant market need not always be proven in attempt
cases.
55
Lessig has been criticized for its suggestion that only intent, and
not relevant market, was in issue,S6 and its holding was narrowed by a
subsequent decision of the Ninth Circuit.57  Recently, it appears that
the Ninth Circuit is clinging to the notion that "evidence of market
power may be relevant, but it is not indispensible where a substantial
claim of restraint of trade is made."58 In other words, if a plaintiff can
prove a section 1 claim, the specific intent and dangerous probability
requirements of the section 2 attempt clause may be inferred without
proof of relevant market. If he cannot make out a section 1 violation he
Bernhard Food Indus., Inc. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 912 (1970), (attempt requires showing of monopoly power). These utterly illogical pro-
nouncements trace back to language from United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d
416 (2d Cir. 1945), which did not involve an attempt claim: "In order to fall within § 2, the monop-
olist must have both the power to monopolize, and the intent to monopolize." Id. at 432.
52. 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
53. Id. at 474.
54. 382 U.S. 172 (1965). The relevant language from Walker Process is as follows: "To
establish monopolization or attempt to monopolize a part of trade or commerce under § 2 of the
Sherman Act, it would then be necessary to appraise the exclusionary power of the illegal patent
claim in terms of the relevant market for the product involved."Id. at 177. Since Walker Process
arose only on the pleadings, concededly unclear according to the Court, and since the only men-
tion in the opinion of the word "attempt" is in the above quoted passage, Walker Process arguably
refers only to the completed offense. Contrast dictum from United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1939): "The existence or exertion of power to'accomplish the desired objective
.. . becomes important only in cases where the offense charged is the actual monopolizing of
any part of trade or commerce in violation of § 2 of the Act" Id. at 226 n.59 (citations omitted).
The Socony Court went on to suggest it was distinguishing section 1 from section 2, not conspiracy
and attempt from actual monopolization; however, the carelessness of the draftsmanship is
striking.
55. Greyhound Computer, Inc. v. IBM, 559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1977). Knutson v. Daily
Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct: 2977 (1977).
56. See, e.g., Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons Prods. Co., 479 F.2d 269, 287 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1032 (1973); Diamond Int'l Corp. v. Walterhoefer, 289 F. Supp. 550, 575 (D.
Md. 1968); Becker v. Safelite Glass Corp., 244 F. Supp. 625, 637 (D. Kansas 1965).
57. Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116, 121 (9th Cir. 1972). But see Greyhound
Computer, Inc. v. IBM, 559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1977).
58. Hallmark Indus. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 489 F.2d 8, 12-13 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 932 (1974).
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must demonstrate the defendant's market power in support of other evi-
dence of specific intent and dangerous probability. The vast majority
of the decisions in the other circuits view specific intent and dangerous
probability as completely separate issues and require proof of relevant
market in all section 2 attempt cases.59
B. Proving Specific Intent
The enormous difficulty in proving that a defendant actually inten-
ded to achieve monopoly power was implicitly recognized by Judge
Hand in his famous opinion in United States v. Aluminim Co. of Amer-
ica.6° In this section 2 monopolization case against a defendant that
controlled ninety percent of the aluminum market, the parties had
piled up a "fabulous record" 61 on the issue of intent. Rather than ex-
amine the evidence of "specific intent," which proved that acts "neutral
on their face, were not in fact necessary to the development of 'Alcoa's'
business, '62 Judge Hand decided that "the issue of intent ceases to
have any importance" 63 in a monopolization case. Where monopoliza-
tion rather than attempted monopolization was the charge, only an
"intent to bring about the forbidden act " 64 was required, since "no
monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing.
65
The courts have recognized that businessmen do not often accom-
pany exclusionary practices with succinct verbalization of their mo-
tives.66 Thus, they have been compelled to draw inferences of specific
intent to monopolize from certain "unfair 67 business practices occur-
ring under particular circumstances. It is axiomatic that the more bla-
tantly "unfair" the practice, the stronger the inference of intent. Like-
wise, the greater the power of the defendant in a particular market, the
easier it is to draw the inference that by his acts he intends to monopo-
lize that market-for just as the monopolist is constrained from prac-68
tices open to the ordinary businessman, so is the near-monopolist for-
bidden to engage in acts available to the competitor who lacks any
significant degree of market power. Logically, then, the courts and
juries should consider the following factors in determining the issue
59. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
60. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
61. Id. at 432.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See note 26 supra.
67. See note 27 supra.
68. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); United Statcs
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), afl'd per curlam, 347 U.S. 521
(1954).
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of specific intent (1) the "directness" of the evidence;69 (2) the degree
of "unfairness" of the conduct; and (3) the market power of the de-
fendant.
The Ninth Circuit has obliquely recognized these factors in Hall-
mark Industry v. Reynolds Metals, Co.70 "Ordinarily specific intent is
difficult to prove and will be inferred from such anticompetitive conduct.
Therefore, evidence of market power may be relevant, but it is not in-
dispensable where a substantial claim of restraint of trade is made.',71
The passage implies that the best evidence of specific intent is direct
evidence, which ordinarily is unavailable. Absent direct evidence an
inference of specific intent may be drawn from predatory conduct.
Such an inference may be supported by proof of market power in a rel-
evant market.
Elsewhere, the same three factors would appear to be fully appli-
cable, even though the circuits other than the Ninth Circuit discuss
market power under the heading of "dangerous probability" rather
than "specific intent. 7 2  Outside of the Ninth Circuit failure to prove
market power will defeat an attempt claim; 73 if market power is proven
it will have further relevance on the issue of intent.74
IV. PREDATORY PRICING
The courts are compelled to draw inferences of intent from "un-
fair" business practices, but the task of delineating what is an "unfair"
practice has proved difficult. Of the "unfair" practices considered to be
evidence of specific intent to monopolize, "predatory pricing" has per-
haps proved the most troublesome. The term "predatory," while meta-
phorically evocative, is confusing and unnecessary-it carries with it a
connotation of killer instinct that goes beyond what it is actually meant
to describe. "Predatory pricing" merely signifies a lowering of price
that somehow passes beyond legitimate competitive pricing. 7  Price
cutting is unlawful only when used as an "instrument of monopoly
69. The authors use "directness" in a loose sense. Direct evidence is provided by %ords
(i.e., memoranda, conversation at meetings, threats, etc.). Indirect evidence consists of mere
acts. Both direct and indirect evidence, in this sense, of specific intent, are almost always circum-
stantial
70. 489 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974).
71. Id. at 12-13.
72. See, e.g., George I Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547 (1st
Cir. 1974).
73. See note 42 supra.
74. "To be successful, an attempt case must establish both an intent to monopolize and a
dangerous probability of successful monopolization; these elements take on meaning only with
reference to an actual or potential exercise of power, which in turn must be assessed in the con-
text of a relevant market" George R Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc.. 508 F.2d
547, 550 (Ist Cir. 1974) (citations omitted).
75. "But price cutting without more is not a violation of the Sherman Act." Schine Chain
Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 120 (1948).
1977]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
power to eliminate competitors or to bring them to their knees."76
Thus, additional "facts and circumstances" '77 must be proved to show
that the purpose of the price cutting was to achieve monopoly power.
The problem, of course, is to determine exactly what "facts and cir-
cumstances" must accompany price cutting in order to evince specific
intent to monopolize. How does one differentiate between a "mere"
price war and a bona fide attempt to drive out all competition?
A. Ninth Circuit View
Hanson v. Shell Oil Co. 78 suggested that the test is economic. The
court indicated two means by which the plaintiff could demonstrate that
Shell's pricing was predatory: (1) by showing it was below marginal
or average variable cost;79 or (2) by proving it "was below its short run
profit-maximizing price and that barriers to entry were great enough to
prevent other entry before the predator could reap the benefits of his
oligopolistic or monopolistic market position." "° The Hanson court,
though, had "some question"' whether the second alternative was le-
gally viable. It is noteworthy that these two alternatives were not
necessarily meant to be the exclusive means of proving predation, for
the court indicated that predation and specific intent "could,"8 2 not
"must," be shown in such a manner.
Thus, while Hanson might be read as setting down an inflexible
rule that price-cutting is not evidence of specific intent to monopolize
absent a showing of pricing below marginal or average variable cost,
the opinion must be considered in the context of the lack of evidence pre-
sented by the plaintiff. First, he failed to submit proof as to Shell's
relevant market share. As stated earlier, outside the Ninth Circuit this
would automatically foreclose any claim under section 2.83 Even under
the Ninth Circuit approach to section 2 attempt cases, plaintiff's failure
to prove relevant market, coupled with his failure to demonstrate a re-
straint of trade under section 1, would bar further inquiry into the pos-
sibility of a section 2 violation.84 Thus, unless the Hanson court meant
to re-adopt the disfavored literal language of Lessig v. Tidewater Oil
Co.85 the entire discussion of specific intent and predatory pricing is
superfluous.
76. Id. While Schine was a monopolization case, the language quotcd is fully applicable
to attempt cases.
77. Id.
78. 541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 813 (1977).
79. Id. at 1358.
80. Id. at 1358 n.5.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1358.
83. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
84. Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1975),
85. 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964). See notes 52-56 supra and
accompanying text.
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Furthermore, the plaintiff presented no probative evidence, other
than the mere act of price-cutting, that Shell had any exclusionary
intent. There was direct evidence that a Shell dealer was told his lease
would be cancelled "if I didn't do as I was told."8 6 This evidence,
however, was presented totally out of context, and no attempt was
made to relate it to Shell's general pricing policy. 87 There was also
some testimony to the effect that a Shell representative told a dealer
that by following Shell's price suggestions, they would enter a "period
of better cooperation."8 8  Finally, Shell's "dealer assistance" program
was found to be one in which the dealers, not Shell, suggested price
reductions.89
Thus, Hanson presented trivial and unpersuasive direct evidence
of intent. He failed to prove market share, from which intent might
have been inferred. He also failed to prove activity that would be un-
lawful under section 1. Therefore, to prove intent, Hanson could
rely only on the nature of Shell's pricing policy itself. In this case then,
where there was no other evidence of specific intent, the court suggests
that only by using the Areeda/Turner approach could the pricing be
shown predatory.
While the Hanson court suggested that the plaintiff might have
made out a prima facie case had he shown that Shell had priced below
marginal or average variable cost, it continued in a footnote to propose,
with considerable reservations, an alternative possibility, "limit
pricing,' '9' i.e., sacrifice of maximum short-run profits for the purpose
of securing long-run monopoly profits. Since limit pricing is on its face
less "unfair" than below-cost pricing, the court suggests that taken
alone, it does not raise an inference of intent. However, when accom-
panied by proof of barriers to entry-which would allow a successful
"predator" to reap his monopoly profits for a time at least-an inference
of intent may be derived.
The final footnote in this section of Hanson purports to lay down
86. 541 F.2d at 1357.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See notes 4-13 supra and accompanying text.
91. The court expressed this possibility as follows:
An alternative possibility might be a showing that the defendant charged a price
which, although above marginal or average variable cost, was below its short run profit-
ufaximizing price and that barriers to entry were great enough to prevent other entry
before the predator could reap the benefits of his oliogopolistic or monopolistic market
position. See International Air Industries, Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., (5th Cir.
1975), 517 F.2d 714, 724. There is some question, however, whether pricing below a
profit maximizing point which is still above marginal and average variable costs should
be considered predatory;, it only discourages inefficient new entrants who must have
higher prices to survive. See Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. Rav. 697, 704-09.
541 F.2d at 1358 n.5.
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a rule of law by which no plaintiff could ever make a prima facie show-
ing of attempt to monopolize unless he could prove that the defendant
was pricing below cost.
While proof of pricing below marginal average variable cost is pre-
requisite to a prima facie showing of an attempt to monopolize, such a
showing, if made, would not show a per se violation. There may be non-
predatory and acceptable business reasons for a firm engaging in such
pricing. Plaintiffs showing of below-cost pricing merely clears the first
hurdle and raises the question of justification. 92
Such a rule is totally irreconcilable with such United States Supreme
Court decisions as Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,93 Lorain Jour-
nal Co. v. United States,94 and United States v. Griffith,95 in each of
which there was no issue of below-cost pricing. If the footnote can
make any sense at all, it must be understood to be limited to the facts
of Hanson's case, which presented no other evidence of specific intent
to monopolize.
Lest there be any doubt that Hanson does not require a cost/price
accounting analysis in every section 2 attempt case, clarification is
available in the subsequent Ninth Circuit decision of Knutson v. Daily
Review, Inc.9 6  In that case plaintiff newspaper distributors charged
defendant newspapers with a panoply of Sherman Act violations in-
cluding resale price maintenance, territorial restraints, and refusal to
deal under section 1 and an attempt to monopolize "the newspaper
trade ' 97 under section 2. The trial court had found for plaintiffs on
the price-fixing count, but for the defendants on the other counts.
Judge Hufstedler stressed that in considering the attempt to mon-
opolize claim, the court was bound to follow the Ninth Circuit rule as
developed in Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co.98 and a line of cases through
Hallmark Industries v. Reynolds Metals CO.99 This rule was expressed
as follows: "In sum, we require (1) only specific intent and (2) some
illegal (under Section 1) or predatory activity from which specific intent
can be inferred. Where the conduct is justified by legitimate business
reasons or merely exemplifies a healthy spirit of competition, an intent
to monopolize is more difficult to support."'00
92. Id. at 1359 n.6.
93. 417 U.S. 901 (1974).
94. 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
95. 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
96. 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 2977 (1977).
97. Id. at 800.
98. 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964). See notes 52-56 supra and
accompanying text.
99. 489 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1973). See text accompanying note 58 supra.
100. 548 F.2d at 814. This passage was based on the premise that "ft]hc sole issue, then,
in this attempt case, is the presence or absence of a 'specific intent to destroy competition or
build monopoly.'" Id. at 814 (emphasis added). Contra, Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co.,
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In reviewing the evidence, the court determined that (1) the sec-
tion 1 price-fixing violation constituted "knowingly unlawful" 101 activ-
ity but did not require an inference of specific intent, (2) defendant
"Sparks'" history of purchasing competitors for prices greatly out of
proportion to the value of their assets provided support for, but did not
compel, an inference of specific intent,102 and (3) "questionable pro-
motional practices" and the "padding of circulation figures" were a
"neutral element in the search for the requisite specific intent."0 3 In a
footnote, the court suggested repudiation of the Areeda/Turner analy-
sis,'04 and a clarification of Hanson, though it cited neither.
Moreover, the specific offense of maximum resale price fixing could be
used to destroy (or exclude) competition or build a monopoly. If the fixed
maximum price is higher than cost but lower than a price that would per-
mit new entrants or smaller scale competitors to operate (i.e. a "limit
price"), then, although not predatory, it could support other efforts to ac-
quire a monopoly.
Significantly, the Knutson plaintiffs had failed properly to define
the relevant market or the market power of the defendant, and there
was no evidence of direct communication to independents that their
lack of conformance to suggested prices would result in termination.
Like Hanson, Knutson failed to provide evidence of market power or
direct evidence of specific intent.'16 Yet the court concluded that the
trial judge might have drawn the inference of specific intent from the
section 1 violation alone or in combination with other evidence, though
his failure to do so was not "clearly erroneous." 0 7 The court's care-
ful review of the evidence of unlawful and unfair activity, however,
does much to dispel the notion that a decision on attempt to monopo-
lize must be based solely on hard accounting evidence. It suggested,
on the other hand, that limit pricing is not as predatory as is below-cost
pricing, but may be probative circumstantial evidence of specific intent
when accompanied by other evidence.10
8
B. Decisions in Other Circuits
The Knutson approach has received substantial support from a
375 F. Supp. 1, 70 (N.D. Cal. 1974) ("The requirement of this circuit is something more than
specific intent.").
101. 548 F.2d at 814.
102. Id. at 815.
103. Id. The court stressed that though it discussed each form of conduct separately, "all
of the acts should be viewed together in determining whether there was an attempt to monop-
olize." Id. at 815.
104. See notes 4-13 supra and accompanying text.
105. 548 F.2d at 814 n.21.
106. Id. at 815.
107. See section IIIB.
108. 548 F.2d at 814.
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recent Eighth Circuit decision, United States v. Empire Gas Corp.1°9
This case included a claim that defendant had attempted to monopolize
the retail sale of liquified petroleum gas. The court stressed its obliga-
tion not to tightly compartmentalize" evidence of specific intent,
which was proved by evidence of "market allocation agreements, ac-
quisitions of competitors and covenants not to compete, among other
things.""' Yet the most persuasive evidence was found to be the de-
fendant's pricing practices, which involved threat's by Empire's officers
that competitors should raise prices and stop soliciting its customers or
be put out of business, coupled with dramatic and immediate price cuts
by Empire when competitors refused to capitulate. The government
elicited some direct testimony that was particularly inflammatory on
the issue of specific intent-such gems as "we have you right where
we want you"" 2 and a threat to play "burnout" with competitors who
refused to raise their prices." t  The district court's conclusion that
Empire's price cutting was innocently competitive was rejected as
"clearly erroneous."'" 4  Though there was no direct evidence that
Empire priced below cost,'" there was evidence of deliberate pricing
to the point at which competitors could not make a sufficient profit.
The Eighth Circuit held that "an attempt to control price, competition
or both demonstrates specific intent to monopolize."" 6  Though the
government had in fact proved both, the district court result was af-
firmed due to the plaintiff's failure to prove "dangerous probability"
of success."
7
The Tenth Circuit, which had considered predatory pricing in
Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp."8 recently had the opportunity to reap-
praise price-cutting under the novel circumstances in Pacific Engineer-
ing & Production Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp."9 The two parties were the
lone survivors in the manufacture of an aerospace chemical, the price
of which was unresponsive to demand. The industry was plagued by
overcapacity and plummeting prices due to changes in U.S. defense
109. 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 1326 (1977).
110. Id. at 299. The court cited Sanitary Milk Producers v. B-rgjans Farm Dairy, Inc,, 368
F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966). The language is ultimately derived from Continental Ore Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962): "In cases such as this, plaintiffs should be given tho
full benefit of their proof without tightly compartmentalizing the various factual components and
wiping the slate clean after scrutiny of each." Id. at 699.
111. 537 F.2d at 299.
112. Id. at 300.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 301.
115. Empire used subsidiaries for price cutting in particular areas and an employee had
stated that "Empire was large enough that some subsidiaries could carry others." Id. at 300.
116. Id. at 302.
117. Id. at 308.
118. 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
119. 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1977).
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policy and "whipsaw" 120 pricing, which was provoked by unscrupulous
contractors. The court of appeals felt that the industry was ripe for a
natural monopoly and concluded that the more diversified, better
capitalized defendant's (hereinafter referred to as "AMPOT") price-
cuts were not predatory. 12  AMPOT's market share was fifty-three
percent when the allegedly illegal behavior began and jumped to eighty
percent within a year; yet the weight of this evidence of market power
was diminished in view of the concentrated buying power of the gov-
ernment contractors. 1' However, AMPOT knew that its continued
low pricing would ultimately mean the demise of the plaintiff (herein-
after referred to as "PE") and maintained an extensive industrial
espionage system over its weaker rival. AMPOT's pricing behavior
paralleled its assessment of PE's prospects of survival. There was
evidence that AMPOT had made an offer to a PE customer to "dump"
a "phony" surplus of the chemical. 123  AMPOT had lobbied against
PE's reclassification as a small business, 124 and AMPOT's market
projections were based on an assumption of the demise of virtually all
competition. Credible defenses to these intimations of specific intent
were presented, but the trial judge found that the price-cutting,
coupled with these "additional facts and circumstances," warranted a
verdict against AMPOT for monopolization and attempt to monopolize
under section 2 of the Sherman Act.
125
The court of appeals reversed, deciding in the defendant's favor
"the fundamental issue [of] whether AMPOT engaged in predatory
price cutting."126  Relying heavily on Union Leader Corp. v. News-
papers of New England, Inc.127 it determined that the acts, other than
price-cutting, were lawful in that "[t]hey were merely auxiliaries to its
general pricing policy and indicate nothing more than an intent that its
pricing succeed in excluding PE from the market."12' A review of the
120. "Whipsaw" is a slang word for the procedure of taking payments from both sides in
a contest to influence a vote. The trial judge used the term to describe the practice of the major
consumers of the aerospace chemical "who would request quotes on which the... contract
would supposedly be let." Id at 792. Instead of letting the contract on that quote, the consumer
would tell the two low bidders to "sharpen their pencils," which would often result "in getting the
low bidder to underbid itself." Id. at 792.
121. Id. at 798.
122. Three contractors accounted for 55% of the total sales of the chemical A single supply
contract sufficed from months to years. In addition, plaintiff and defendant had sufficient capacity
to produce the entire national supply of the chemical. Thus, wide fluctuations in market share
were possible merely on the basis of bids to these three buyers. Id, at 792.
123. Id. at 793.
124. Id. The trial court, presumably constrained by the opinion in Eastern R.RL Presi-
dents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) concluded that this was
only "symbolic" of AMPOT's intent. 551 F.2d at 794.
125. AMPOT was also found to have price discriminated in violation of section 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1970). 551 F.2d at 791.
126. 551 F.2d at 791.
127. 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961).
128. 551 F.2d at 795.
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evidence in AMPOT's pricing behavior revealed that AMPOT's prices
were "well below its average total cost"1 29 but above its average vari-
able cost. In fact, "during the period of alleged predation, prices actu-
ally became somewhat higher than they had been."" 0
To determine whether the pricing was predatory, the court, at the
outset, criticized the "reasonability" '' test of price changes: "Although
this statement points to the correct result in this case, it still leaves
something to be desired. There is no indication of when downward
price changes cease to be 'reasonable.' "132 The court then went on to
examine the Areeda/Turner marginal and average variable cost for-
mula and Scherer's broader approach, which includes consideration of
long-run factors and subjective intent.1 33 It found that AMPOT's prices
were always above its marginal costs, low prices persisted into the long-
run, and this was not a case of "limit pricing," or sacrifice of maximum
short-run profits for the purpose of securing long-run monopoly bene-
fits.1 34  The Areeda/Turner rule was described as "extremely benefi-
cial '1 35 in examining pricing practices, but the court expressly dis-
avowed any intent to adopt a "solely cost-based test."'
' 36
Since the court dismissed AMPOT's market share almost out-of-
hand and refused to consider the cumulative effect of the evidence,
137
other than pricing, on specific intent to monopolize, one might specu-
late that it had indeed used a "solely cost-based test."138  The court's
awkward struggle for some sort of concrete test illustrates the pervasive
tension in the federal courts, which are so uncomfortable with the un-
certainty inherent in the "unfairness approach,"1 39 but so reluctant to
adopt such absolute standards as those proposed by Professors Areeda
and Turner.
At any rate, the holding has limited impact since this industry was
in such poor shape that its "problems were resolved only by the impo-
129. Id. at 792.
130. Id. at 795.
131. Section 2 does not "prohibit price changes which are wil.hin a 'reasonable' range, up
or down." The Tenth Circuit's "reasonability" standard was promulgated in Telex Corp. v.
IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 927 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975). In Telex, defen-
dant was found to have a relevant market share well below monopoly level and to have main-
tained approximately a 20% profit margin despite price cuts. The case's applicability to situ-
ations in which market share is high and profit margin low (or negative) is consequently quite
dubious. See, e.g., the Ninth Circuit's discussion of IBM's monopoly power in Greyhound
Computer Corp., Inc. v. IBM, 559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1977).,
132. 551 F.2d at 797.
133. See note 4-13 supra and accompanying text.
134. 551 F.2d at 797.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 795.
138. Id. at 797.
139. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
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sition of external controls in the interest of national defense" 140 And,
indeed, as the court of appeals observed, had AMPOT "employed price
leadership to raise the price to a profitable level for both competi-
tors" 141 it might have run afoul of the antitrust laws at the other
extreme. Thus, faced with the reality of the trial court's opinion that
"the only way AMPOT could have avoided violating the antitrust laws
was to raise prices to a noncompetitive level in order to save its smaller,
undercapitalized rival," 142 the Tenth Circuit may well have had a "def-
inite and firm conviction that a mistake had been made ' 143 by the court
below.
In International Air Industries, Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 44
the Fifth Circuit discussed predatory pricing and specific intent to mon-
opolize in the context of a price discrimination claim under section 2(a)
of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. 145  The
court embarked upon a lengthy economic analysis of "predatory in-
tent" in examining plaintiff's contention that it was entitled to a direc-
ted verdict and, borrowing in part from the Areeda/Turner article,1
4 6
and in part from Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 47 applied
the following test:
In short, in order to prevail as a matter of law, a plaintiff must at least
show that either (1) a competitor is charging a price below his average
variable cost in the competitive market or (2) the competitor is charging a
price below its short-run, profit-maximizing price and barriers to entry are
great enough to enable the discriminator to reap the benefits of predation
before new entry is possible.14'
The court then found that defendant was selling at a price well above
its average variable cost and that "barriers to entry in the cooler pad
market were virtually non-existent.1 49
This case can perhaps be viewed as a Robinson-Patman Act coun-
terpart' 50 to Hanson. The court felt that direct evidence of predation
had been quoted out of context. And while relevant market had been
proven, defendant's power in that market was insubstantial. Thus, a
140. 551 F.2d at 797.
141. Id. at 796.
142. Id. at 795.
143. Id. at 798.
144. 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
145. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970). An attempt to monopolize claim was also filed under section
2 of the Sherman Act; this claim received but minimal treatment in the court of appeals opinion,
which characterized as (at most) harmless error the omissions of certain direct and indirect
evidence of specific intent. 517 F.2d at 729.
146. See note 4 supra.
147. 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
148. 517 F.2d at 724.
149. Id. at 725.
150. Indeed, the bulk of the court's analysis of specific intent would be fully applicable to an
attempt to monopolize discussion.
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directed verdict could be based only on proof of pricing below average
variable cost.15' As in Hanson, the Areeda/Turner approach was utilized
as an alternative when other elements of plaintiff's proof of specific
intent had failed.
V. CONCLUSION
At most, the following "rules" may be extracted from Hanson v.
Shell Oil Co.: (1) price-cutting, standing alone, is insufficient for a find-
ing of specific intent; (2) price-cutting, shown to be below marginal or
average variable cost, is prima facie evidence of specific intent; (3)
limit-pricing, below a profit-maximization point, coupled with evidence
of barriers to entry that would make exclusionary practices profitable,
may raise an inference of specific intent. The case clearly cannot stand
for the proposition that proof of below-cost pricing must be shown in all
section 2 attempt cases.
The Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Knutson v. Daily Review
Inc. suggested that: (1) limit pricing alone does not raise the inference
of specific intent; (2) limit pricing, coupled with other evidence may
raise an inference of specific intent; (3) a section 1 violation may, but
does not necessarily, raise an inference of specific intent. Knutson's
significance in comparison with Hanson is thus two-fold. It suggests
that the courts are to consider as a whole all of the evidence of specific
intent and should not bar a section 2 claim merely because of failure to
meet the standards of rigid accounting formula. It also clarifies Judge
Duniway's doubts in Hanson concerning the "question . ..whether
pricing below a profit maximizing point which is still above marginal
and average variable costs should be considered predatory." 5 2 Such
limit pricing, while concededly not predatory could, according to Knut-
son, "support other efforts to acquire a monopoly.' 53
The cases from the other circuits support the notion that traditional
methods of analyzing "predatory intent" have not as yet fallen prey
to the absolute economic test proposed by Professors Areeda and
Turner. United States v. Empire Gas Corp. in particular, relied upon a
common-sense examination of all of the evidence, direct and indirect,
on specific intent. International Air Industries v. American Excelsior
Co. likewise examined all of the evidence, which it found to be insuf-
ficient for a plaintiff's directed verdict, while considering the Areeda/
Turner model as a possible alternative. Pacific Engineering & Produc-
tion Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp. faced with an anomalous potential sec-
tion 2 situation, relied heavily on economic analysis, but was careful to
151. 517 F.2d at 725.
152. 541 F.2d at 1358 n.5. See text accompanying note 90 supra.
153. 548 F.2d at 814 n.21.
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point out that it was not adopting a "solely cost-based test." 54 Signifi-
cantly, none of these opinions has gone so far as to literally adopt the
tenets of Professors Areeda and Turner, and none has ruled out the use
of proof of limit-pricing as a means of demonstrating specific intent.
Likewise, none of these cases has considered the use of an economic
rule for analysis of price-cuts in the classic monopoly situation, where, it
must be conceded, proof requirements in the area of specific intent
are much less stringent.
Thus, Knutson in the Ninth Circuit, and other recent cases decided
elsewhere, support the following conclusion: that Hanson did not hold
that pricing below average variable cost must be shown at the outset in
a price-cutting type of attempt case, but rather suggested that when
evidence of specific intent (other than of pricing) is weak or non-
existent, a plaintiff may use an economic analysis of the defendant's
pricing practices to salvage an otherwise unsupportable case. Indeed,
the utility of such a cost/price analysis is not to be denied-proof of
below-cost pricing, where available, and where not otherwise justifi-
able, may be conclusive evidence of monopolistic intent. Yet modern
accounting methods do not often permit such precise analysis, espe-
cially in multi-line industries dealing in nonstandardized commodities.
Furthermore, accountants are rivaled only by lawyers and bookmakers
in their ability to manipulate the tools of their trade in order to satisfy
the frequently antipodal wishes of their various clients. To subject
section 2 of the Sherman Act to a compulsory cost/price accounting
analysis in every instance would be effectively to rule it out of existence.
Fortunately, while some trial balloons have been sent up, it appears
that the courts may already be recognizing the "average variable cost"
test as no more than a passing fad.
154. 551 F.2d at 797.
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